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Abstract 
Sharks can kill, wolves and bears can maim, and bats and birds can spread disease. Human 
existence has a long history of such conflicts. But as our populations and activities expand, 
human-wildlife encounters are an increasingly common source of tension. Some species 
pose a risk to humans, including through the spread of disease, but may also be 
endangered or at risk of extinction themselves. In such cases, there is a duty to conserve 
(nature), but also to protect (the public). Deciding how to respond requires decision-makers 
to make difficult but important value judgments. This article searches for ways to improve the 
legal processes for managing these unique situations of human-wildlife conflict. It 
investigates whether principles of international environmental law and human rights can be 
part of the solution, and if so, to what extent. The analysis concludes that one of the 
foremost roles for law is to prescribe processes for decision-makers which are rational, 
balanced and transparent. Existing principles like the precautionary principle are relevant, 
but they are only part of a broader risk analysis which must also account for human rights, 
communities and cultural values. 
Introduction 
Culling wildlife to protect against livestock loss, disease or risk of injury is highly 
contentious.1 The debate is muddied by various issues relating to animal welfare, rights to 
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1 In this article, we use both the term ‘cull’ and ‘lethal management’ although there are noted 
differences between the two. Culling generally refers (rather colloquially) to deliberate attempts to 
reduce population sizes, whereas lethal management is a broader term which can extend to individual 
animals that pose a risk to human interests in some form.  
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culture, health and other human rights as well as the potential for environmental damage.2 
Nevertheless, lethal management is increasingly being viewed as an anthropocentric 
‘precautionary’ measure to avoid the infliction of injury or disease to humans, even where 
the species concerned is endangered or threatened. In January 2014, for instance, the 
Australian Government allowed the lethal control of endangered shark species off the coast 
of Western Australia claiming it was in the ‘national interest.’ 3  Following, a ‘rigorous 
examination’ of the proposal, the Western Australian Environmental Protection Agency 
eventually recommended the program not go ahead.4 In other Australian states the practice 
of drum-lining5 continues unabated.6  Likewise, in the United States, State and Federal 
agencies have lethally controlled hundreds of endangered mountain lions due to 
‘depredation complaints on livestock and on pets and [also] because of concerns for human 
safety.’7 Gray wolves in the United States and Canada have also been targeted for similar 
reasons.8  
                                                
2 P Dickson and WM Adams, ‘Science and Uncertainty in South Africa's Elephant Culling Debate’ 
(2009) 27(1) Environ Plann C Gov Policy 110. 
3 For a copy of the ‘Statement of Reasons’ for the exemption, see Commonwealth of Australia 
‘Statement of Reasons for granting an exemption under section 158 of the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) <www.environment.gov.au/epbc/notices/pubs/158-
statement-shark-drum-line-deployment.pdf> accessed 1 November 2015. 
4 Western Australia Environmental Protection Authority, ‘EPA recommends Shark Hazard Mitigation 
Drum Line proposal should not be implemented’ (11 September 2014) 
<http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/news/mediastmnts/pages/eparecommendssharkhazardmitigationdrumline
proposalshouldnotbeimplemented.aspx>; see also K Woolaston and E Hamman, ‘The operation of 
the precautionary principle in Australian environmental law: An examination of the Western Australian 
White shark drum line program’ (2015) 32 EPLJ 327. 
5 Drum-lining is the process of luring and catching sharks using a barrel (i.e. the drum) attached to the 
sea floor and baited with a hook. The practice is fatal to sharks. 
6 G Burke, ‘Queensland: 621 sharks killed off Queensland coast through control program’ ABC News 
(online) (21 August 2015) 
 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-21/621-sharks-killed-off-queensland's-waters/6715136>.   
7 E Rominger ‘Culling Mountain Lions to Protect Ungulate Populations: Some Lives Are More Sacred 
Than Others.’ Transactions of the 72nd North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference 
Wildlife Management Institute March 20 to 24, 2007 in Portland, Oregon, 
 <www.wildlifemanagementinstitute.org>. 
8 M Musiani and PC Paquet, ‘The Practices of Wolf Persecution, Protection, and Restoration in 
Canada and the United States’ (2004) 54(1) BioScience 50. It should be noted that Gray Wolves are 
endangered in some areas but not others. In the Northern American state of Alaska, for instance, 
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The threat of disease can also result in a decision to cull endangered wildlife. In 
China, in the face of ‘misinformation and media hysteria’9 concerning the H5N1 ‘bird flu’, 
culling of wild birds was reported despite evidence the practice is rarely successful.10 At 
around the same time, the decision of a zoo in Thailand to euthanize dozens of tigers 
thought at risk of spreading the virus was particularly contentious.11 In Australia, flying foxes 
have also been targeted to protect against equine influenza (the ‘Hendra Virus’) 12 
notwithstanding the vital role flying foxes play in seed dispersal and pollination in some of 
Australia’s World Heritage listed Wet Tropics.  
In all these instances, human interests take precedence over species despite the fact 
that they are endangered. The point of this article is not to add to the ever-expanding thicket 
of literature surrounding animal welfare, animal rights and species justice. 13  Rather, it 
explores the narrower question of what legal processes ought to guide decision-makers in 
these instances of conflict. The issue of human-wildlife conflict has been well studied in the 
conservation literature,14 however, discussion of these issues has largely been overlooked in 
the legal discipline. There is thus a need to consider how best to design legal responses to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Gray Wolves are reported to be in ‘healthy numbers’. See B Stallard, ‘Gray Wolf stays endangered 
despite conservationists’ request’ Nature World News (online) (4 July 2015) 
 <http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/15484/20150704/gray-wolves-stays-endangered-despite-
conservationists-request.htm>. 
9 BirdLife International (2008) ‘The H5N1 avian influenza virus: a threat to bird conservation, but 
indirectly’ <www.birdlife.org/datazone/sowb/casestudy/176> accessed 1 November 2015. 
10 C Feare ‘Conservation implications of Avian Influenza’ (2005) 14 RSPB Research Report. 
11 M Thornley ‘Avian influenza ravages Thai tigers’ (2008) 82(11) Australian Veterinary Journal 652. 
12 See for example, R Plowright, H Field, C Smith, A Divljan, C Palmer, G Tabor, P Daszak, and J 
Foley, ‘Reproduction and nutritional stress are risk factors for Hendra virus infection in little red flying 
foxes (Pteropus scapulatus) (2008) 275 Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 861. 
13 See for example, R Garner, A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World 
(Oxford University Press 2013); 
14 See for example, M Conover, Resolving Human-Wildlife Conflicts: The Science of Wildlife Damage 
Management (CRC Press 2001); R Woodroffe, S Thirgood, and A Rabinowitz (eds), People and 
wildlife: conflict or coexistence? (Cambridge University Press, 2005); KK Karanth, AM Gopalaswamy, 
R DeFries and N Ballal ‘Assessing Patterns of Human-Wildlife Conflicts and Compensation around a 
Central Indian Protected Area’ (2012) 7(12) PLoS ONE e50433, doi:10.1371/ journal.pone.0050433; 
and MM Draheim, F Madden, J-B McCarthy and ECM Parsons, Human-Wildlife Conflict: Complexity 
in the Marine Environment (Oxford University Press, 2015). Other relevant literature is referred to 
throughout this article. 
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human-wildlife conflict, particularly from a normative standpoint.15 The issue is all the more 
worthy of discussion where it intersects with other legal norms such as human rights.16 
Moreover, in line with recent calls for improved evaluation of existing environmental 
jurisprudence (as opposed to the mass proliferation thereof),17 whether existing principles of 
international environmental law and human rights can be marshalled to provide an effective 
solution is investigated.  
This article is structured in three parts. Part One provides an overview of the existing 
literature surrounding human-wildlife conflicts. It defines ‘conflict’ and highlights the common 
thread which suggests societies respond to wildlife encounters in emotional and irrational 
ways. Part One also highlights the role of culture in both creating and responding to 
instances of conflict. Part Two introduces a new aspect to the debate, one which questions 
the ‘lethal management’ of endangered wildlife which pose a risk to humans (health or 
otherwise). There are several endangered species which have been the subject of deliberate 
‘state-sanctioned’ controls (by either culling or lethal management) including the white shark 
in Australia, the Zanzibar leopard, wild birds in China, tigers in Thailand, the grey wolf in the 
United States, and flying foxes in Australia.18 Each of these instances raises interesting 
questions about risk analysis and how decisions to euthanize an endangered species are 
actually made. Finally, Part Three examines a ‘dual’ role for the precautionary principle as a 
tool for assessing the risks to both humans and wildlife. This final part also raises the 
conflicting concerns about human rights (the right to culture, life and health in particular) 
and, in the end, suggests that more work is required to clarify the contributions that the 
precautionary principle and human rights can make to risk analysis and decision-making in 
situations of human-wildlife conflict.  
                                                
15 J Smits, ‘Redefining Normative Legal Science: Towards an Argumentative Discipline’ (2009) 7 
TICOM Working Paper 45. 
16 See for example, D Shelton, ‘Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection: Is there a Hierarchy?’ in E De Wet and J Vidmar (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The 
Place of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2012). 
17 P Martin and A Kennedy (eds), Implementing Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
18 As noted earlier, mountain lions in the United States (US) have also been subject to lethal 
management. Those instances would make an interesting case study of human-wildlife conflict and 
the legal responses thereof. However, they are not considered in this article given the inclusion of the 
Gray Wolf example which presents similar issues for discussion in the US context. For further 
information about the lethal management of US mountain lions refer to Rominger above (n 7) and for 
a good discussion of the issues, see C Papouchi, ‘Effects of Sport Hunting Mountain Lions on Safety 
and Livestock’ Mountain’ Mountain Lion Foundation (online) 7 August 2006  
<http://www.mountainlion.org/sport_hunting.asp> 
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I. Human- Wildlife Conflict 
Humans interact with wildlife in many ways. Indeed humans have done so for many 
centuries. Such encounters can be positive or negative; however, often this interaction is 
considered as having a largely negative impact on wildlife. This impact can stem from 
interactions such as modifying or eliminating habitat as a result of development or 
agriculture, living alongside wildlife, and more obvious interactions such as hunting or taking 
wildlife for sustenance. The other consideration in this interaction, and one that can raise 
much more compelling arguments to a large portion of the population, is the impact that 
wildlife has on human populations. This impact is broad-ranging and can include loss of 
livestock and property, loss of time and money dealing with this loss and opportunity costs, 
where people forgo the economic or lifestyle choices due to impositions placed on them by 
the presences of wildlife or conservation of wildlife.19 In addition to this, perhaps the ‘least 
common but most emotive’ threat from wildlife is the killing or endangering of people.20  
 
A. Defining the Conflict 
But how does one define human-wildlife conflicts? And how might human society recognise 
them when they occur? One generally accepted definition which followed the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) World Parks Congress in 2003 provides that ‘[a 
conflict exists] when wildlife requirements overlap with those of human populations, creating 
costs both to residents and wild animals.’21 Such a conflict may occur, for example:  
 
…because a lion has attacked someone’s livestock or a gorilla has raided a person’s crops. 
The conflict also occurs when a person or community seeks to kill the lion or gorilla, or when 
a person retaliates against the authorities that are in charge of conserving wildlife and its 
habitat.22 
 
                                                
19 For a thorough discussion of the risk that wildlife pose to humans see S Thirgood, R Woodroffe and 
A Rabinowitz, ‘The Impact of Human-Wildlife Conflict on Human Lives and Livelihoods’ in R 
Woodroffe, S Thirgood, and A Rabinowitz (eds), People and wildlife: conflict or coexistence? 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
20 Ibid, 1. 
21 IUCN World Park Congress (WPC), Preventing & mitigating human-wildlife conflicts (2003) WPC 
recommendation 20.  
22 F Madden, ‘Creating Coexistence between Humans and Wildlife: Global Perspectives on Local 
Efforts to Address Human-Wildlife Conflict’ (2004) 9(4) Human Dimensions of Wildlife 247, 248. 
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A similar definition is put forward by Conover:  ‘[wildlife conflicts are] situations occurring 
when an action by either humans or wildlife has an adverse effect on the other.’23 Others 
suggest that the nature of the conflict needs to be broken down further still and to consider 
costs to humans and costs to wildlife separately.24  
A common aspect of most definitions seems to be the requirement for a ‘conflict,’ not 
merely an ‘encounter’. There appears to be a need for a negative outcome (‘costs’ or 
‘adverse effects’) to humans or wildlife or both. On the weight of the literature, and in the 
interests of moving towards a more substantive legal discussion, this article proposes a very 
broad definition and defines conflict as: any significant interaction between humans and 
wildlife which results in an adverse effect (including perceived effects) on either wildlife or 
humans or both.  
The term ‘adverse effect’ is consistent with that used by Conover (above). The only 
other point to add, at least in the confines of this paper, is that it is important to be careful in 
distinguishing between the conflict and human responses to conflict. In many ways, 
responses are a separate form of conflict in and of themselves. Readers will note the 
inclusion of ‘perceived effects’ in the definition, as the literature reveals human responses to 
conflicts seem to be as much about ‘perception’ of conflict as it is about actual physical 
encounters.25 Thus, this article discusses legal options for analyzing and managing the 
actual risk as well as the perception of risk.26 
 
B. Responses to Human Wildlife Conflict 
Responses to human-wildlife conflicts are continually shaped by history, politics and cultural 
practices and beliefs.27 In many instances, humans are likely never to encounter a particular 
animal except perhaps in a zoo. Yet anxiety in relation to that animal, individually and 
collectively, can rise to levels where people cease to think or act rationally, or consistently 
with the science. Instances of ‘dangerous’ conflict are actually extremely rare. In fact, a 
                                                
23 Conover above (n. 14) at 8. 
24 J Young, M Marzano, R White, D McCracken, S Redpath, D Carss, C Quine and A Watt, ‘The 
emergence of biodiversity conflicts from biodiversity impacts: characteristics and management 
strategies’ (2010) 19 Biodiversity and Conservation 3973. 
25 A Dickman, ‘Complexities of conflict: the importance of considering social factors for effectively 
resolving human–wildlife conflict’ (2010) 13 Animal Conservation 458, 458.  
26 In this article ‘endangered species’ is defined to be a species which has been included on the IUCN 
red list between the categories ‘near threatened’ to ‘critically endangered’. See IUCN, ‘Red List’ 
<http://www.iucnredlist.org/> accessed 1 November 2015. 
27 H Wieczorek-Hudenko, ‘Exploring the Influence of Emotion on Human Decision Making in Human–
Wildlife Conflict’ (2012) 17(1) Human Dimensions of Wildlife 16. 
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conservative figure puts the world-wide number of humans killed or seriously maimed by 
wildlife each year ‘in the hundreds.’28 Despite the media hype, for instance, the number of 
unprovoked fatal shark attacks in Australia sits at just under one per year.29 Many more 
people are reported to die from drowning each year.30  
While the likelihood of the risk of harm is therefore not great, decisions relating to 
interactions with wildlife are often not made purely on rational or ‘risk-based’ grounds. This is 
embedded in human culture and in human history. Hudenko, for instance, maintains that 
‘many people may have preconceived ideas about wildlife based on their upbringing, cultural 
influences or prior experience’. 31 Madden agrees, suggesting that very often, the level of 
public outcry is entirely disproportionate to the loss of livestock or property and that ‘public 
outcry often has much more to do with perceptions of potential risk, as well as a lack of 
control over addressing the problem.’32 ‘[E]ven a small level of wildlife damage,’ Dickman 
reports ‘can still elicit harsh responses.’33 For Manfredo and Dayer this is the one ‘common 
thread’ in responding to human-wildlife conflicts.34 In their words: ‘the thoughts and actions 
of humans ultimately determine the course and resolution of the conflict.’ 35  Human 
responses to these conflicts have the potential to have serious consequences. As Dickman 
concludes, ‘conflict between humans and wildlife is one of the most widespread and 
                                                
28 See Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n 18) 14. More recent data, is available from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). For example, in relation to human-
lion encounters: FAO, ‘Managing the conflicts between people and lion: Review and insights from the 
literature and field experience.’ (2010) Wildlife Management Working Paper 13, 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/k7292e/k7292e00.pdf> and also in relation to Africa as a whole: FAO, 
‘Human-wildlife conflict in Africa: Causes, consequences and management strategies’ (2009) FAO 
Forestry Paper 157, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1048e/i1048e03.pdf>.  
29 Targonga Zoo, ‘Australian Shark attack file’ 
 <https://taronga.org.au/animals-conservation/conservation-science/australian-shark-attack-file/latest-
figures> accessed 1 November 2015. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Hudenko above (n. 27). 
32 Madden above (n. 22) at 250. 
33 Dickman above (n. 25) at 461. 
34 M Manfredo and A Dayer ‘Concepts for Exploring the Social Aspects of Human–Wildlife Conflict in 
a Global Context’ (2004) 9(4) Human Dimensions of Wildlife 317. 
35 Ibid, 317. 
Legal Responses to Human Wildlife Conflict   64 
intractable issues facing conservation biologists today.’ 36  Thus, effective strategies for 
decision-making are desperately needed.37 
The influence of culture in creating and responding to wildlife conflict has received 
increased attention in the literature. So much so, in fact, that there is now a strong argument 
that the management of human–wildlife interactions should be ‘informed by a more 
systematic understanding, use, and application of biological, social, and cultural knowledge 
and norms.’38 In other words, society and culture, and people’s perceptions about animals - 
rightly or wrongly - are as important to managing conflict as the raw scientific data. As 
Dickman reports, human perceptions of risk are ‘heavily influenced by social and cultural 
perceptions, values history and ideology.’39 To develop an effective response, an improved 
understanding of social and cultural perceptions of wildlife is needed, accompanied perhaps 
by attempts to influence those perceptions in ways which are beneficial for both species and 
communities. 
The influence of human culture on wildlife is not always particularly positive and can 
sometimes result in irreversible ecological outcomes. Consider for instance, the case of the 
Zanzibar leopard (panthera pardus adersi) hunted to extinction on the African island of 
Zanzibar. To the people of Zanzibar, the Zanzibar leopard, (the largest wild carnivore on the 
Island) had long been a ‘culturally salient animal.’40 The leopard was protected from hunting 
during colonization by the British between 1920s and the 1950s. After the Zanzibar 
revolution in 1964, however, the new government sponsored an eradication program.41 The 
decision-making process around the state-sponsored hunting of leopards seemed to have 
revolved largely around the ‘cultural demonization’ of the species.42 Attacks on dogs, poultry, 
sheep goats and even people had been reported throughout the early half of the 20th 
century 43  and this ‘undoubtedly generated a fear which was disproportionate to the 
                                                
36 Dickman above (n. 25) at 458. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Madden above (n. 22) at 253. 
39 Dickman above (n. 25) at 459. 
40 M Walsh and H Goldman, ‘Killing the King: The Demonization and Extermination of the Zanzibar 
Leopard’ in E Dounias, E Motte-Florac and M Dunham (eds) Animal symbolism: Animals, keystone of 
the relationship between man and nature? (Éditions de Institut de recherché pour le développement, 
2007) 1133-1182, 1151. 
41 H Goldman and M Walsh ‘Is The Zanzibar Leopard (Panthera pardus adersi) Extinct?’ 91(1) 
Journal of East African Natural History 15, 16. 
42 Walsh and Goldman above (n. 40). 
43 Ibid, 1138. 
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probability of their occurrence.’44 It appears, however, that this fear was compounded by 
spiritual and cultural beliefs that witches exercised a form of ‘magical control’ over the 
leopards to harass and intimidate islanders. 45  Today, by most accounts, the Zanzibar 
leopard is believed to be now extinct.46 
The case of the Zanzibar leopard reveals interesting insights about the nature of 
human and endangered wildlife conflict. More specifically, as Walsh and Goldman conclude, 
the case of the leopard illustrates:  
 
…how attitudes and actions towards a salient animal can be configured and reconfigured in 
the context of a complex and changing political and ecological landscape – and how this can 
have disastrous and irreversible consequences for the animal concerned.47  
 
The demonization of other species has also influenced the creation of and human responses 
to wildlife conflict. The tiny aye aye (daubentonia madagascariensis) for example, is an 
endangered lemur native to Madagascar. Some communities have labelled the aye aye ‘a 
harbinger of doom’ and it is thought by some to bring bad luck to crop yields.48 Some even 
believe that the entire village should be burned down if an aye aye is seen nearby.49 As a 
result the aye aye has been hunted and this, in addition to other pressures, has caused a 
population decline of over fifty percent in the last thirty years.50 
Interestingly, sharks are one species that have been revered but also respected 
throughout much of the world. Coastal communities in Eastern Indonesia, for instance, have 
a special spiritual relationship with whale sharks.51 In Hawaiian culture, tiger sharks and 
                                                
44 Ibid, 1139. 
45 Goldman and Walsh above (n. 41) at 16. 
46 Walsh and Goldman above (n. 40) at 1135; see also Goldman and Walsh above (n 41). 
47 Walsh and Goldman above (n. 40) at 1134. 
48 IUCN, ‘Red List of Threatened Species’ Daubentonia madagascariensis (aye aye) 
 e.T6302A16114609, accessed 01 November 2015. 
49 Dickman above (n. 25) at 462.  
50 IUCN, above (n. 48). 
51 J Karam, D Dwyer, C Speed and M Meekan, Assessing traditional ecological knowledge of whale 
sharks (Rhincodon typus) in eastern Indonesia: a pilot study with fishing communities in Nusa 
Tenggara Timur, final research report for Dept. of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 
Canberra, tender 2007/01363 (Charles Darwin University, School for Environmental Research, 
2008).  
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white sharks have historically been linked with ‘influential spirits.’52 Likewise, in the South 
Pacific island nation of Fiji, sharks are closely associated with spiritual beings. The Fijian 
god Dakuwaqa, for instance, was believed to ‘manifest himself as a great shark’.53 On the 
other hand, in Western cultures, sharks have tended to be demonized. Peter Benchley’s 
1974 novel ‘Jaws’ had a profound effect on some Western community psyches and one 
which the media has ‘exploited’ over the years.54 Community reactions to sharks often flow 
through into government policy. Indeed, Australian scholar, Dr Christopher Neff, who has 
studied the politics of shark attacks, argues that the numbers can often be misrepresented. 
He maintains that shark bites are in reality totally random events but that they ‘are not 
perceived that way.’55  
As can be seen, human interactions with wildlife are multidimensional, and in 
particular are culturally constructed. This makes the task of developing an effective legal 
framework for dealing with these situations all the more challenging. Nevertheless, culture 
and cultural practices are highly relevant to all forms of wildlife management. Decision-
makers must simultaneously walk a delicate line between cultural sensitivity and scientific 
rationalism. The issue of culture and species conflict is further considered against the 
backdrop of human rights in Part Three. 
II. The Lethal Management of ‘Dangerous’ Endangered Species 
A. What is ‘Lethal Management’? 
‘Lethal management’ or ‘lethal control’ are terms commonly used in lieu of ‘persecution’ of 
particular species.56 ‘Culling’ is a narrower term and generally refers (in a colloquial way) to 
the intentional or state-sanctioned reduction of a population of species as a direct response 
                                                
52 L Taylor, Sharks of Hawaii: Their Biology and Cultural Significance (University of Hawaii Press, 
1993).  
53 JM Brunnschweiler, ‘The Shark Reef Marine Reserve: a marine tourism project in Fiji involving local 
communities’ (2010) 18(1) Journal of Sustainable Tourism 29-42, 37. 
54 B Francis, ‘Before and after Jaws: Changing Representations of Shark Attacks (2012) 34(2) Great 
Circle: Journal of the Australian Association for Maritime History 44-64, 44. 
55  C Neff, ‘Shark bite statistics can lie, and the result is bad policy’ (16 January 2014) The 
Conversation (online) < http://theconversation.com/shark-bite-statistics-can-lie-and-the-result-is-bad-
policy-21789>.  
56 Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n. 19) at 2. 
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to human-wildlife conflict.57 Lethal management measures can be undertaken by individuals 
and groups, and also by State bodies and private institutions (private zoos for instance).  
There have been many past attempts to minimise conflict by introducing non-lethal 
methods to control wildlife, and these attempts are ongoing. They include such things as 
chemical repellents,58 live trapping and relocation, and exclusion zones.59  Unfortunately, 
evidence suggests that for many types of conflict a complete resolution through non-lethal 
means is highly uncommon, despite rigorous and continued scientific and social efforts.60 As 
a result, it is often the case that the conflict escalates to the point where it is considered that 
the numbers of a species needs to be controlled using lethal means. 
Lethal management is by no means an accepted practice. There are wide-ranging 
conservation impacts, together with moral arguments against its use. Lethal management 
has directly led to the extinction of several species.61 More commonly, it has led to a very 
substantial contraction of their geographical ranges and steep reduction in population 
numbers. For example, it has been suggested that lethal management has had a significant 
effect on diminishing elephant numbers with some authors reporting in some parts of Africa 
‘problem animal control’ is as prevalent a cause of death as ivory poaching .62 There are 
likely to be various other effects on the species itself, such as effects on the locality of the 
species, behavioural effects and other indirect impacts.63  In addition to this are the effects 
on other species and on the environment more generally when the species which is targeted 
is a ‘keystone species’.64 
                                                
57 Whilst culling is normally focussed on reducing a population of species, lethal management can 
also include controlling particular individuals or small groups of species that pose a risk to human 
safety or other interests. 
58 S Baker, S Ellwood, R Watkins and D MacDonald, ‘Non-Lethal Control of Wildlife: Using Chemical 
Repellents as Feeding Deterrents for the European Badger Meles meles’ (2005) 42(5) Journal of 
Applied Ecology 921. 
59  S Vantassel, ‘Wildlife management professionals need to redefine the terms: Lethal control, 
nonlethal control, and live trap’ (2012) 6(2) Human-wildlife Interactions 335. 
60 Dickman above (n. 25) at 459. 
61 Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n. 19) at 3. 
62 For example, in Botswana from 1989-1996, 239 dead elephants were reported to have been 
lethally ‘controlled’ whereas 259 were ‘poached.’ See Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n. 
at 18) 7.  
63 For a fuller discussion of the effects on wildlife see Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n. 
18) at 8-9. 
64 Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above (n. 18) at 10. 
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Lethal management is often a decision based on emotion, which has been made as 
a result of a human fatality or injury. Killings are therefore often viewed as ‘retaliatory.’65 
After undertaking various case studies and attempting to characterise the nature of attacks 
on humans, Quigley and Herrero were left with the ‘overwhelming impression…that people 
have dealt with the subject in a manner that is commonly less than objective’.66 This reflects 
the powerful influence of culture and emotion in response to conflicts discussed above. 
In addition, the effectiveness of specific lethal management programs are frequently 
called into question. In China in the mid 2000’s, bird flu was thought to be transmitted by 
migratory birds, including many endangered species. In 2005, at Qinghai Lake, hundreds of 
waterbirds were reportedly culled despite limited evidence of the birds carrying the disease 
or of their ability to transmit the disease to humans.67 At around the same time, a private zoo 
in Thailand reportedly took the controversial ‘pre-emptive’ step of culling dozens of tigers, 
which were also believed to transmit the disease.68 This was despite the World Health 
Organisation’s position that they posed no serious risk to humans.69  
Notwithstanding the challenges associated with lethal management, there are 
arguments that it does have a legitimate role to play in the protection of human safety and 
livelihood, as well as conservation.70 Treves and Naughton-Treves, for instance, provide 
three reasons why lethal management may be valuable;71 
 
1. If the lethal management is controlled, it does have the potential to reduce the threat 
to public safety and livelihoods, without the threat of extinction to the species. 
2. Removing problem wildlife has the potential to pacify locals and deter them from 
instigating their own (and potentially more harmful) lethal management. 
                                                
65 H Quigley and S Herrero, ‘Characterization and prevention of attacks on humans’, Systems’ in 
Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz (eds) above (n. 18) at 28. 
66 Ibid, 47. 
67 BirdLife International above (n 9). 
68 M Thornley ‘Avian influenza ravages Thai tigers’ (2008) 82(11) Australian Veterinary Journal 652. 
69 ‘Bird flu tigers facing mass cull’ BBC News (20 October, 2004) 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3760560.stm>. 
70 It is noted that many animal welfare organisations are, however, likely to strongly disagree with the 
appropriateness of lethal management practices in most instances of conflict.  
71 A Treves and L Naughton-Treves, ‘Evaluating lethal control in the management of human-wildlife 
conflict’ in People and wildlife: conflict or coexistence?’ in Woodroffe, Thirgood, and Rabinowitz above 
(n. 19) at 87. 
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3. The removal of some of a problem species may select for conspecifics [that is, a 
member of the same species] that naturally avoid human contact, forcing directional 
selection for a ‘wilder population’ of that species. 
 
State-based lethal management, as a last resort, would appear to be more effective at 
protecting public health whilst maintaining a species than, say, villagers or farmers left to 
their own means. In addition, in some instances where public safety is at serious risk, lethal 
management may be unavoidable.  
B. Lethal Management of ‘Dangerous’ Endangered Species 
It seems paradoxical to consider the lethal management of an endangered species. Where a 
species is facing extinction, or indeed plays a valuable role in sensitive ecological 
processes, why would a State deliberately further its demise? Yet governments around the 
world have considered and implemented such programs. In North America, the Gray Wolf 
(canis lupus) was for a long time considered a direct threat to public safety and livestock. 
Where it once ranged over most of the Northern Hemisphere, human development has 
impacted its habitat and lethal persecution has threatened its survival. 72  Today, large 
populations of the wolf can be found only in northern Canada and Alaska.73 Like the 
Zanzibar leopard (above) and the white shark (below) the gray wolf seems to have suffered 
from a form of state-sponsored demonization. Indeed, most of the campaigns to eradicate 
the wolf were government-led: 
 
Until recently, bounty programs had been established, suspended, and reinstated in various 
North American jurisdictions. Wolves have been poisoned, trapped, snared, and shot from the 
ground and air. The most successful strategy used to exterminate wolves has probably been 
the poisoning campaigns that involved personnel hired by government agencies.74 
 
The endangered white shark (carcharodon carcharias) - also known as the ‘great white’ or 
‘white pointer’ - has recently been the target of lethal control programs in Australian coastal 
waters. Although the Eastern Australian states of Queensland and New South Wales have 
been culling sharks for decades,75 the West Australian Government recently sought approval 
for a three year lethal control (baiting and drum-lining) program in response to several recent 
                                                
72 Musiani and Paquet above (n. 8) at 50.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Australian Government, Recovery Plan for the White Shark (Commonwealth of Australia 2013) 35. 
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shark attacks.76 Despite the scarcity of evidence on white shark behavior and populations, 
and particularly on distribution and migratory patterns, 77  Australian State and Federal 
agencies seem intent on lethal management without proper regard to the level or scope of 
the risk to humans.78 Further, such unfocused control programs often catch marine species 
which pose no threat to human safety.79 From 2014 to 2015, the Queensland shark control 
program killed over several hundred sharks as well as dozens of turtles, dolphins, whales 
and dugongs.80 
Sharks are one species that, perhaps unlike any other, raise serious and very real 
fears in many people. This is despite the low risk of encountering one in the wild. As Kock 
and O’Riain point out: 
  
...although sharks rarely injure or kill people, when they do it induces strong negative 
responses from the public, fueled by sensationalist media coverage.81  
 
In examining human responses to shark attacks, Peace questions traditional suggestions 
that ‘anti-predator’ responses to wildlife are somehow ‘genetically hard-wired’ into humanity. 
He argues that human reactions are heavily influenced by popular culture and by the media 
claiming that the fascination with white sharks ‘lies in their capacity to keep us mindful that 
nature … was once a force well beyond the dictates of culture…’82 Peace again raises the 
conflict between culture and species discussed above. Unlike other apex predators (lions, 
tigers, bears etc.), white sharks continue to generate fear, Peace writes, because they exist 
outside of the ‘commanding process of [human] enclosure’.83 When a species cannot be 
                                                
76 Woolaston and Hamman above (n. 4). 
77 Australian Government above (n. 75) at 6. 
78 Woolaston and Hamman above (n. 4). 
79 G Cliff and S Dudley, ‘Reducing the environmental impact of shark-control programs: a case study 
from KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. (2011) 62 Marine and Freshwater Research 700. 
80 In total, 621 sharks were caught from 2014-2015 off the coast of Queensland, including: 8 White 
Sharks; 251 Tiger Sharks; 111 Bull Sharks; and 173 other Whaler Sharks. See ABC News, 
‘Queensland: 621 sharks killed off Queensland coast through control program’ (21 August 2015) 
 <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-21/621-sharks-killed-off-queensland's-waters/6715136>. 
81 A Kock and JM O’Riain, ‘Living with white sharks: non-lethal solutions to shark–human interactions 
in South Africa in Conflicts in Conservation’ in S Redpath, R Gutiérrez, A Evely, KA Wood and JC 
Young (eds) Conflicts in Conservation: Navigating towards solutions (Cambridge University Press, 
2015) 237. 
82 A Peace, ‘Shark attack!  A cultural approach’ (2015) 31 Anthropology Today 3, 7. 
83 Ibid. 
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tamed, it appears more likely that demonization and negative cultural reactions will strongly 
influence human responses. As examples, consider some of the other prominent 
community-led demonization and eradication campaigns including wolves in Norway84 and 
bears in Japan.85 
The potential for endangered species to spread disease, however, adds an entirely 
new dimension to the debate. In today’s increasingly globalized world, infectious diseases, 
like bird flu, the Ebola virus, swine flu, equine influenza and so forth can have serious 
geopolitical and security ramifications in addition to public health impacts. The prompt lethal 
management of migratory species might be seen as ‘precautionary’ or ‘pre-emptive’ 
measure, even without strong evidence the disease can transmit to humans. China’s 
‘Qinghai Lake’ wild bird destruction (discussed above) is one example of this. In that 
instance, ‘public paranoia’ fueled emotional responses, even where there was ‘general 
scientific consensus about the minor role that wild birds play in spreading the disease.’86  
Another example is the Australian governments’ approach of controlling endangered 
grey headed flying foxes thought to transmit equine influenza (Hendra Virus), which is fatal 
in horses and, in rare cases, humans.87 One interesting aspect of the flying fox example is 
that bats are also critical for pollination of Australian forests, including its World Heritage Wet 
Tropics. 88  Nevertheless, immediate human concerns are ‘always paramount’, says the 
Queensland Government which implemented the program: ‘[we need to put] the health and 
wellbeing of the community as the central consideration regarding flying-fox roost 
management.’ 89  All of this begs the question about how decision-makers should best 
approach decisions about lethal control of dangerous (or potentially dangerous) threatened 
                                                
84 J Linnell, EJ Solberg, S Brainerd, O Liberg, H Sand and P Wabakken ‘Is the fear of wolves 
justified? A Fennoscandian perspective’ (2003) 13(1) Acta Zoologica Lituanica 27. 
85 J Knight, ‘Culling demons: The problem of bears in Japan’ in John Knight (ed), Natural enemies: 
People-wildlife conflicts in anthropological perspective (Routledge, 2000). 
86 BirdLife International, above (n. 9). 
87 R Plowright, H Field, C Smith, A Divljan, C Palmer, G Tabor, P Daszak, and J Foley, ‘Reproduction 
and nutritional stress are risk factors for Hendra virus infection in little red flying foxes (Pteropus 
scapulatus)’ (2008) 275 Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 861. 
88 ABC News (online), ‘Breeders want flying fox culls to stop hendra’ (8 July 2008) 
<www.abc.net.au/news/2011-07-08/breeders-want-flying-fox-culls-to-stop-hendra/2787200> 
89 Queensland Government Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, ‘Authorised flying-
fox roost management’ 
<www.ehp.qld.gov.au/wildlife/livingwith/flyingfoxes/roost-management.html> accessed 1 November 
2015. 
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species, to reach decisions which best serve the long-term welfare of both humanity and the 
species in question.  
III. Negotiating Conflict: Towards an Effective Legal Response 
One of the foremost challenges of law, and indeed international environmental law, is to 
develop decision-making frameworks which are capable of negotiating competing interests. 
There is an important difference between law and policy worth noting here. On the one 
hand, policies set the goals (or strategies) that the government of the day intends to follow. 
But on the other hand, the law is, for all intents and purposes, the governmental tool for 
achieving those goals.90 In many ways, the law ought not to prescribe particular outcomes, 
but to uphold, above all, proper process, which respects the discretion of democratically 
elected decision-makers, provided they act in good faith, in accordance with the Rule of 
Law,91 and consistent with internationally recognised human rights norms.92 Relevantly, the 
precautionary principle, a key feature of this paper, is particularly concerned with supporting 
proper decision-making processes as opposed to mandating particular outcomes.93  
 This last section considers what might contribute to a sensible legal framework 
where public health and conservation managers are faced with potential risks to both 
                                                
90 For an interesting take on the difference between law and policy, see TJ Low, ‘Law vs. public 
policy: a critical exploration’ (2003, Summer) Cornell J of Law & P Policy 493+. LegalTrac. Web. 19 
Jan. 2016. 
91 The ultimate role of law in democratic society is, of course, a contentious one. Indeed it has been 
since the early natural law theorists like Aristotle (384-322 BC) and later St Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274 AD). Enlightenment thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau progressed the role of law 
society in the pursuit of ‘man’s’ individuality (over state suppression) and more recent philosophies 
have focused on the significance of concepts like due process and the theory of procedural justice. 
See for example, J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971); and, for a different 
take: A Sen, The Idea of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2009). In the context of environmental 
law, the notion of procedural justice has been taken up, alongside issues of distributive justice, and 
justice as recognition under the movement of environmental justice. See for example, D Schlosberg, 
Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature (Oxford University Press, 2007) 
and G Walker, Environmental Justice: Concepts, Evidence and Politics (Routledge, 2012).  
92 Consistency with human rights norms is an important constraint on government decision-making 
and forms the basis for many of the arguments made in this article. 
93 E Fisher and R Harding, ‘The precautionary principle and administrative constitutionalism: the 
development of frameworks for applying the precautionary principle’ in E Fisher, J Jones and R von 
Schomberg (eds), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward 
Elgar, 2006). 
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humans and other species. It begins by considering existing principles of human rights and 
exploring instances of conflict between human rights and environmental law. 
A. Conflict with Human Rights 
International human rights treaties impose obligations on states to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights.94  These obligations are implemented through various legislative and policy 
instruments, and states are afforded a degree of discretion in the steps they choose to 
take. 95  The relationship between human rights and the environment is complex and 
multifaceted.  While in many ways protection of the environment and human rights can be 
mutually supportive, in other situations the two objectives may be quite incompatible.  In 
cases of human-wildlife conflict, tension arises between the competing objectives of 
protecting human rights and protecting the environment, particularly where the wildlife 
involved are endangered or threatened species. As shown in the case of the Zanzibar 
leopard (discussed above), there may also be cultural considerations which lead to the 
persecution and ultimate extermination of certain species or otherwise impact on the survival 
or welfare of wildlife.   
Many human rights possess environmental dimensions. Most commonly this is 
understood as a relationship where good environmental conditions are a prerequisite to the 
fulfilment of human rights.96  For instance, air and water pollution can represent a threat to 
the enjoyment of the rights to health97  and to an adequate standard of living.98   The 
obligations to protect and fulfil these rights would consequently require that states take steps 
to address pollution.  In some situations, particular species of wildlife could pose a threat to 
the enjoyment of human rights.  For example, the potential for animals to spread disease 
has obvious impacts on the right to the highest attainable standard of health.99 Policies 
designed to manage populations of mosquitoes, flying foxes and other species considered 
                                                
94 H Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, International Human Rights in Context (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 185-189. 
95 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Art. 2 (‘ICCPR’); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 3 January, 1976) Art. 2 (‘ICESCR’). 
96 P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 282; A Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23(3) 
European J of Int’l L 613, 614. 
97 ICESCR above (n. 95) Art. 12. 
98 Ibid, Art. 11. 
99 Ibid, Art. 12. 
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dangerous to human health can therefore be justified from a human rights perspective on 
the basis that they are necessary to protect and fulfil the right to health. In serious cases of 
human-wildlife conflict the right to life may also be affected.100 This right has been defined to 
include not just the right to be protected from arbitrary deprivation of life, but also to be 
protected against potentially life-threatening conditions.101  The right would therefore seem to 
justify taking action such as relocating or eradicating species which pose a serious threat to 
human life.102  
Other sorts of legally protected rights can also be indirectly implicated by human-
wildlife conflict.  For example, where feral or wild animals predate upon livestock or destroy 
crops this has the potential to interfere with economic rights such as the right to earn a living 
by work of one’s choice or the right to an adequate standard of living.103  For people who rely 
on subsistence agriculture, these impacts could interfere more directly with the enjoyment of 
rights to food, water and an adequate standard of living.104  One of the justifications for the 
West Australian shark control program was the impact that the shark attacks (or the fear of 
shark attacks) were having on the local tourism industry and other local business 
interests.105  Similar arguments have been made more recently in northern New South 
Wales following a spate of incidents which led to a reported downturn in trade for surf shops 
                                                
100 ICCPR above (n. 95) Art. 6. 
101 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6: The right to life (Article 6 of the Covenant) UN 
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol 1) (30 April 1982); Human Rights Committee, Communication No 
67/1980, UN Doc CCPR.C/17/D/67/1980 (27 October 1982) 20 (‘Port Hope Environmental Group v 
Canada’); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) (2006) 
IACHR (Ser C) No 146 [161]; Budayeva and others v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, 
Application Nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, 20 March 2008); Oneryildiz 
v Turkey [2004] XII Eur Court HR 657. 
102 Of course, paradoxically, the eradication of certain species ‘in the name of human rights’ may in 
fact have serious consequences for human health and well-being. For example, the removal of certain 
keystone marine life (like sharks) may disrupt wild fish stocks which impact upon the sustenance 
rights of remote islander and coastal communities in the region. 
103 ICESCR, above (n. 95) Arts. 6 and 11. 
104 Ibid, Art. 11. 
105 J McHugh, ‘Sharks take a bit out of WA Surfing Business’ WA Today (online) (19 March 2013) 
<www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/sharks-take-a-bite-out-of-wa-surfing-business-201303192gdah.html 
>; S Holland, ‘Shark anxiety strikes WA behaviour and tourism hit, WA Today (21 November 2014) 
<www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/shark-anxiety-strikes-wa-behaviour-and-tourism-hit-20141121-1rifo. 
html>.  
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and other businesses in the affected towns.106 This impact could be understood as an 
interference with people’s economic rights, and governments (arguably) have an obligation 
to take measures to address these impacts.   
There is another sense in which human social, economic and cultural rights are 
relevant to human-wildlife interaction. Rather than viewing wildlife as a potential threat to 
humans, certain species can also be regarded as a natural or cultural resource to which 
certain groups may claim rights to hunt or otherwise utilise. Most notably this applies to 
indigenous peoples who may hunt and fish particular species as part of their cultural 
practices or traditional forms of livelihood.  Or certain species play important ceremonial, 
totemic or spiritual roles for certain peoples. In circumstances where culturally significant 
species are endangered or threatened, there will be additional reasons for protecting those 
species, and a broader range of considerations will be at play. 
International human rights law protects people’s cultural and religious rights in a 
number of ways. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (ICESCR) both guarantee 
the right of peoples to self-determination, including the right to use natural resources.107 The 
ICCPR also guarantees to all ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities the right to practice 
their culture.108  The human rights affirmed in international law are expanded and explained 
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which, 
although voluntary, still requires that States assure indigenous peoples’ rights to practice 
their cultures and customs, particularly with respect to their lands and waters.109  Where 
traditional customs and practices involve the taking or use of particular species, such 
                                                
106 T Forbes, ‘Spate of shark attacks and close calls take toll on NSW north coast towns; surfers call 
for shark cull’ ABC News (12 August 2015) <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-12/shark-attacks-close-
calls-affecting-businesses-nsw-north-coast/6693080>  
107 ICCPR above (n. 95) Art. 1; ICESCR above (n. 95) Art. 1.  
108 ICCPR above (n. 95) Art. 27. 
109 United National Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) adopted 13 Sept. 
2007, Arts. 25 and 26. Similar rights are protected in the International Labour Organisation’s 
Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention, opened for signature 27 June 1989, ILO Convention 169 
(entered into force 5 September 1991) Arts. 4, 7, 15 and 23. The close relationship between 
indigenous peoples and biological resources is also recognised in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993), 
see Preamble and Art. 10. 
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conduct would be protected by the UNDRIP and states would be required to make 
allowance for it in their domestic laws.110  
In a post-colonial context, the justifications for permitting indigenous taking of certain 
species of wildlife are well-accepted.111   It is also commonly asserted that indigenous 
hunting and fishing is part of a culture of environmental stewardship which is consistent with 
sustainability.112 In such a context, human rights principles support decision-making which 
would permit a limited impact on the environment in order to fulfil recognised rights and 
correct historic injustice. However, it should not always be assumed that indigenous 
lifestyles are necessarily compatible with environmental conservation, and questions arise 
where indigenous peoples may be utilising species for more commercial reasons.113  In such 
situations, rights to maintain traditional practices and to pursue economic self-reliance must 
be balanced against the demands of sustainability.114   
There are other cultural uses of nature and wildlife which may not be so easily 
justified on human rights grounds, and for which decision-making frameworks are more 
problematic to identify.  For example, recreational hunting could be argued to be an exercise 
of cultural rights, although this argument has been rejected in a number of cases where it 
was held that a ban on hunting did not amount to a breach of human rights.115  It might also 
                                                
110 UNDRIP above (n 112) Arts. 11, 24, 25, 26, 31.   In Australia, Indigenous rights to hunt or fish are 
partly protected in a range of state and federal legislative instruments including the Native Title Act 
1994 (Cth); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities (Justice, Land and Other Matters) Act 
1984 (Qld); and Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984 (Cth). 
111 See UNDRIP above (n 112) Preamble, which recognises that Indigenous peoples have suffered 
historic injustices as a result of colonisation and dispossession of their lands, and recognises the 
need to promote Indigenous rights derived from cultural and spiritual traditions associated with those 
lands.   
112 Ibid; see also ILO Convention 169 above (n 112) Arts. 8, 17; Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development UN Doc (1992) A/CONF.151/26 (vol I); 31 ILM 874, Principle 22.  
113 B Richardson, ‘Indigenous Peoples, International Law and Sustainability’ (2001) 10(1) Review of 
European Community and Int’l Environmental Law 1, 3. 
114 See for example, the Convention on Biological Diversity above (n 112) Art. 10, which obliges 
States to preserve traditional and customary uses of biological diversity that are compatible with 
conservation and sustainable use. The Fur Seal Treaty permitted the hunting of seals by indigenous 
peoples but placed limitations on the practice designed to prohibit hunting in commercial quantities of 
for commercial purposes: Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, opened for signature 7 July 1911, 
37 Stat 1542, TS 564 (entered into force 5 December 1911, terminated 23 October 1941) Art. IV. 
115 This was argued by the appellants in Whaley and Another v Lord Advocate (Scotland) [2007] 
UKHL 53. In that case the House of Lords rejected the argument that a ban on fox hunting 
represented a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 
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be argued that cultural rights entitle humans to use natural spaces such as forests, rivers or 
beaches for enjoyment. When these spaces present dangers to human welfare, issues arise 
as to the appropriate response.  For example, beach culture plays a large part in Australian 
coastal communities but is potentially threatened by the impact of sharks, crocodiles, 
jellyfish or other dangerous species.  These cultural uses of wildlife or wild spaces are not 
specifically protected by human rights law outside of an indigenous context, yet where 
human-wildlife interaction presents a risk to human rights then there may be a duty on states 
to take protective action. 
From all of this, questions arise as to the threshold of risk to human rights which 
should trigger the obligation to take action and how the obligation to protect human rights 
should be balanced against other obligations. How ought the law manage the conflict 
between conflicting human rights and environmental laws? Human rights law does provide 
some guidance for how to balance competing human rights obligations116 but little direction 
for how human rights duties should be reconciled with other competing interests such as the 
protection of the environment.117 The suggestion is made, as will be further explained, that 
                                                                                                                                                  
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd071128/whaley-1.htm>; see also Adams v 
Scottish Ministers (2004) SC 665; R (Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2007] QB 305. 
116 See for example, the ICCPR above (n 95) which provides that the exercise of certain rights may be 
limited where it is necessary to protect public health, public order, national security or the rights of 
others (Arts. 12, 19, 21 and 22).  
117  In recent years, attempts at creating and protecting procedural rights with respect to the 
environment have been introduced. Consider for instance the implementation (predominately in 
Europe) of the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making 
and access to justice in environmental issues opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 UNTS 447 
(entered into force 30 October 2001) (‘Aarhus’) which has, at least to some extent, guaranteed 
procedural rights for people to access environmental information and challenge environmental 
decisions. Aarhus, however, does little to reconcile substantive instances of human rights and 
environmental conflict except to provide some legal avenues for the resolution thereof. Moreover, it 
should also be noted that a ‘right to a healthy environment’ has been enshrined in scores of national 
constitutions such as Ecuador (Title II, Chapter II) and South Africa (section 24) which guarantee 
some substantive protections with respect to ‘healthy living’ and ‘sustainable use of resources’ for 
humans, but as Lewis notes: ‘[many of these] constitutions employ a very wide range of language, 
and are open to interpretation. Even an apparently simple formulation such as ‘right to a healthy 
environment’ raises significant questions as to the scope and content of the right. How is a ‘healthy 
environment’ to be defined?’ See B Lewis, ‘Environmental rights or a right to the environment? 
Exploring the nexus between human rights and environmental protection’ (2010) 8(1) Macquarie J of 
Int’l and Comparative Environmental L 36-47, 43. Thus, whilst the presence of a constitutional right 
may be positive, it is likely to provide little scope for managing conflict between environmental rights 
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other principles of international law are better equipped for identifying and assessing the 
potential risks. The most well-known and probably best suited of which is the precautionary 
principle. 
B. The Precautionary Principle: What Role Could It Play? 
The precautionary principle is often construed as a key principle of international 
environmental law.118 Although various definitions abound, it generally provides that where 
there is a credible threat of serious or irreversible harm to the environment, scientific 
uncertainty should not be used as a reason for postponing action to prevent that harm.119 
The principle has multiple aspects and the confines of this paper do not permit a full 
canvassing of the extensive literature written about the precautionary principle. 120  It is 
sufficient for the present discussion that pursuant to the precautionary principle:  
 
 …authorities are prepared to tackle risks for which there is no definitive proof that there is a 
link of causation between the suspected activity and the harm...121 
 
Despite its growing presence in international agreements, there has been some reluctance 
to accept that the precautionary principle has been elevated to the status of a ‘principle’ of 
international law.122 Doubts seem most prevalent in area of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ jurisprudence.123 
                                                                                                                                                  
and other human rights. If anything, it is likely to cast further doubt in those instances. A major focus 
of this article, therefore, is on whether the precautionary principle - as a principle relevant to both 
human health and environmental law - can play a conciliatory role in instances of competing rights, 
not in securing further rights to begin with. 
118  S Alam, JH Bhuiyan, T Chowdhury and E Techera, Routledge Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Routledge, 2013)  46-50; see also N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles to 
Legal Rules (Oxford, 2002) ch 3. 
119 Rio Declaration above (n. 115) Principle 15. 
120 See de Sadeleer above (n. 121) at 275. 
121  N de Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EU Law’ (2010) (N°5) Aansprakelijkheid 
Verzekering En Schade 173-184 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293606> 173-174. It is important to point 
out that precaution is not the same as prevention. Prevention is itself a separate principle of 
international environmental law. For a discussion of the principle of prevention, which originates from 
the 1938 Trail Smelter Case is closely related to the polluter pays principle, see: See de Sadeleer 
above (n 121) 62-63. 
122 The various definitions of the principle appear to be an obstacle to general acceptance. See A 
Sirinskiene, ‘The Status of Precautionary Principle: Moving Towards a Rule of Customary Law’ (2009) 
4 (118) Jurisprudence 349–364. 
123 Ibid. 
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Whether it forms part of ‘customary international law’ and thus a ‘source’ of international law 
under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is particularly contested in 
the literature. Some fifteen years ago, the Honourable Paul Stein AM, a former Judge of the 
New South Wales Land and Environment Court (in Australia), suggested that: ‘the 
preponderance of opinion nowadays is that the principle has become part of international 
customary law’.124 Indeed, some institutions like the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS), appear to have treated it as part of customary law.125 Today, however, the 
‘preponderance of opinion’ is probably far less certain than Stein AM suggested. Whilst the 
use of the word ‘principle’ might imply immediate recognition as a principle of international 
law, whether it is or not is still largely up for debate. 
Although the principle is most well known in environmental law, it also has a well-
documented history in public health.126 For example, the principle has been used to assist 
decision-makers when the effect of an action is uncertain such as in the early cases 
surrounding asbestos and occupational health and safety.127 Further, the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has viewed the principle as ‘an integral part of the decision-making processes 
leading to the adoption of any measure for the protection of human health.’128  
Like environmental law, public health entails trade-offs between public benefits on 
the one side and private rights/competing public interests on the other.129 Proponents of the 
use of precautionary principle in health and environmental law appear to hold very similar 
values, placing health of the natural world above economic development, private interests 
and political agendas. International treaties have addressed the principle this way. The 2001 
                                                
124 The Hon. PL Stein AM, 'Are decision-makers too cautious with the precautionary principle?' (2000) 
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Tribunals over the Reach of the Precautionary Principle’ (2011) 38(2) Ecology Law Quarterly 527 at 
533. 
126 World Health Organisation (WHO)  ‘The precautionary principle: protecting public health, the 
environment and the future of our children’ (2004)  
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there was insufficient evidence surrounding the effects of asbestos and so the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration had a right to regulate the use of the substance even where such 
regulation would adversely affect businesses.  
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Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,130 for instance, states the principle 
as a main objective in analysing the risk posed by persistent organic pollutants to both 
human health and to the environment.131 Likewise, the principle has been used with respect 
to both the environment and health in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 132  The 
Cartagena Protocol allows parties to refuse the import of ‘living modified organisms’ on a 
precautionary basis where there is lack of scientific certainty on ‘the extent of the potential 
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity… taking into account risks to human health’.133 
One major benefit of the precautionary principle in addressing the issues raised in 
this paper is that it can be applied to the assessment of risks to humans and species. When 
the principle is triggered (in instances of threats of serious or irreversible harm), questions 
might be asked: What is the real risk of a shark attack in this area? How likely is it that this 
species will transmit the disease to humans? What does the best available science say? 
Similarly, if a cull is proposed, it must be asked; is there a risk that culling this population will 
have a long term negative impact on the species? What does the best available science 
say? What other ‘risk averse’ options are there to a cull? 
At this initial stage - information gathering - the precautionary principle has great 
value. By enabling an assessment of the extent of a particular risk, it ensures that health and 
conservation authorities act in a way which is informed by scientific and other cogent 
evidence. However, the gathering and evaluation of information - in and of itself - is not 
sufficient to guide decision-making in situations of human-wildlife conflict.  Other principles 
are required which can assist in managing the risks identified. 
The precautionary principle is part of the broader process of risk analysis which 
involves a two-part process of first: risk assessment; then followed by risk management.134 
While acquiring information about potential risks is a crucial first step, deciding how to 
manage those risks is considerably more problematic.   As De Sadeleer puts it, managing 
the very ‘public’ question of ‘how safe is safe?’ is decidedly more difficult.135 What can the 
precautionary principle contribute to this second part of the decision-making process? 
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In cases of human-wildlife conflict, it is argued that there are two limitations to the 
utility of the precautionary principle as a guiding concept for decision-making.  The first is 
that the principle is not well-equipped for taking account of non-scientific, unquantifiable 
factors which may be relevant to a decision, such as cultural, religious or other indirect 
impacts.  In particular, it does not easily accommodate the broader contexts in which a 
decision is made. As De Sadeleer admonishes: ‘the risk is not just a question for the 
experts…’  He continues;  
 
[I]t takes on a distinct individual meaning once situated within its political social and economic 
context…accordingly a risk management decision must be taken by politicians.136   
 
The second limitation is that the precautionary principle does not include detailed guidelines 
for how competing interests are to be balanced.  Where protection of an endangered 
species conflicts with protection of human health, for example, the principle does not explain 
what weight should be attached to these various interests or how to resolve the tension 
between them.  It does set out the general principle that decisions ought to be precautionary 
in nature, and should try to avoid or minimise harm where possible, but it is less useful in 
judging how much harm ought to be tolerated.  So, while the precautionary principle is very 
useful at the first step of risk analysis (risk assessment), other principles, norms and 
processes need to be incorporated to guide the second step (risk management). Those 
principles are lacking. 
It is here that human rights principles may be of use.  By incorporating human rights 
into the analysis decision-makers would not only be able to assess a broad range of human 
impacts, including social, cultural and economic impacts, but could also identify any relevant 
legal obligations which governments are required to uphold. Where a legally enshrined 
human right is at stake, decision-makers may be justified in giving priority to the protection of 
that human right over environmental impacts. At all times, however, this decision-making 
should be guided by the overarching purpose of the precautionary principle, which is to 
ensure that risks of harm are adequately assessed and decisions are made rationally, 
proportionately and cautiously. The gravity, likelihood and urgency of threats to both human 
rights and the environment must be assessed and any action taken in the name of human 
rights protections should be confined to that which is necessary and proportionate. 
Take as a brief example of this discussion, the Chinese waterbirds instance referred 
to above. If such a circumstance were to arise again, Chinese authorities would be required, 
pursuant to law, to accumulate all accurate and reliable scientific information on the risk to 
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human health and, at the same time, information on the threats to the survival of the species 
by a possible act of human intervention (i.e. a cull). Then, at the second stage of the 
decision-making process the risks to both birds and humans could be appropriately 
managed by a broader base of decision-makers weighing the relevant human rights against 
the informed risks to the waterbird population and having regard to considerations of 
necessity and proportionality. The decision-making process, if time permitted, should of 
course be underpinned by public consultation and freely available information.137  
The above thoughts are exploratory in nature and more work needs to be done to 
investigate the best methods for managing situations of human-wildlife conflict, particularly 
where lethal management of endangered species is concerned.  While both the 
precautionary principle and human rights have a place, the exact relationship between them 
requires greater examination, as does the possible contribution of other closely-related 
principles of governance such as accountability and transparency.138 
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Conclusion 
Instances of conflict between humans and wildlife are nothing new. Such encounters 
predate civilization but with increasing global populations, resource use and urban sprawl, 
human interactions are becoming increasingly diverse.139 For the most part, wildlife-human 
encounters are positive; enriching and inspiring human existence. Throughout the world, 
they are a source of economic and community wellbeing, deeply entrenched in many 
indigenous cultures. But to the modern world, they can also be an increasing negative 
source of conflict; threatening livestock and crops, spreading disease and providing 
competition for scarce natural resources.140 
The argument in this article is that legal responses to instances of conflict are under-
evaluated and in need of further academic attention. Through the lens of several brief 
examples, the more vexed question of lethal management of endangered species has been 
investigated, in part to show how complicated and multi-faceted such decisions can be. To 
avoid the proliferation of environmental law (for the sake thereof), an approach which sits 
within the existing frameworks of environmental law and human rights has been explored. 
The most relevant mechanism, the precautionary principle, is a crucial part of risk analysis, 
but it cannot fully accommodate the multitude of complex and interrelated factors which 
ought to be considered. It is suggested that human rights principles have a place within the 
decision-making framework, but further work is required to explore exactly how that 
framework ought to be constructed to ensure that actions taken are proportionate and 
scientifically justifiable.  
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